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This paper examines international data on patented inventions, R&D
expenditures, and scientists and engineers engaged in inventive activity.
It reaches two principal conclusions which have some bearing on the
modeling offirm behavior and possibly on policy actions which might be
taken toward the stimulation ofinvention. First, the datashow compara-
tive advantage patterns in invention similar to patterns observed in
products. The production of pioneering invention is concentrated in
certain firms located in countries with the best economic laboratories for
invention. Large parts of industry in most countries import inventions
and concentrate on adaptive invention rather than investing heavily in
R&D. Second, the data show that inventions per scientist and engineer
have declinedfrom the late 1960s to the late 1970s in almost all ofthefifty
countries for which data are available.
Theseconclusions are basedondataonpatentedinventionsfrom many
countries. To defend them one must argue not only that patented inven-
tions are a reasonable proxy for inventions in general but also that this
proxy relationship has a reasonable degree of international comparabil-
ity. Further, to support the second conclusion one must argue that no
major changes in the proxy relationship have taken place over the past
ten to fifteen years.
These conclusions have a threefold defense. First, because ofinterna-
tionalconventionsregarding patentingandthe requirementsfor patenta-
bility andthe high degreeofinternationalpatenting (i.e., patentsgranted
to foreigners), ageneralstandardizedlegal basisfor patentingexists. This
is further standardized by the widespread adoption of the International
Patent Classification system. Second, patent data show regular patterns
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and consistency. Patenting is highly correlated with R&D spending in
the United States and other countries where reasonably good data exist.
Most patents granted are subsequently cited as "next best art" in the
United States and other countries with citation requirements.
1 Patent
infringement cases are important enough in most countries to indicate
that patents are not trivial or irrelevant. Finally, there is little evidence
that standards ofpatentability have changed drastically in recent years in
most major centers of invention. Nor is there evidence to suggest that
firms in almost all industries in almost every country of the world have
changed their policy toward obtaining patents to a degree sufficient to
explain the data.
Section 5.1 ofthis paperpresents a descriptive summary ofpatentdata
and discusses different types ofpatentsystems and standardsfor patenta-
bility. Section 5.2 shows the trade patterns of the data. Section 5.3
provides data supporting the conclusion that inventions per scientist and
engineer have declined and argues the case for interpretingthis phenom-
enon as the result of exhaustion of "invention potential." Section 5.4
discusses implications for technology market analysis.
5.1 International Invention: A Descriptive Summary
Tointerpretdataonpatentingitisfirst useful to summarize theoptions
open to a firm to alter the technology it uses:
(1) It can engage in fundamental or basic research to obtain findings
that will improve the efficiency of its more applied research.
(2) Itcanengage in applied research designed to invent a new product
or process and bring it to the development stage.
(3) It can engage in the testing, pilot production, and plant design
work required to bring inventions developed by its own applied research
into use.
(4) It can purchase inventions (or in the case of unprotected inven-
tions, imitate them) and engage in strictly adaptive researchanddevelop-
ment bringing them into use.
(5) It can purchase semi- orfully developed inventions "embodied"in
machines, chemicals, or "turnkey" plants, making only minor modifica-
tions of other inventions.
Of these activities, (1) produces few patentable inventions; (2) pro-
duces most conventional or utility patents; (3) produces a number of
utility patents (especially ofprocess inventions) and a numberof"petty"
patents (utility models); (4) produces most petty patents; and (5) gen-
erally does not produce patented inventions.
1. Wright and Evenson (1980) reported that approximately 75 percent of the patents
granted in specialized chemical fields (oils and food chemicals) are subsequently cited as
next best art in other patents.91 International Invention
Legalsystems andindustrialorganizationpoliciesin differentcountries
influence the types of inventive activities undertaken by firms and the
patentabilityofinventions. Somecountriespursuepolicieswhich encour-
age the holding ofinveqtions in trade secrecy. When industrial organiza-
tion structures effectively discourage competition in an industry, firms
may have little incentive to sell new technology in direct form and will
attempt to capture rents through the sale ofnew technology embodied in
products. This tendencyis reinforcedby tradesecrecylaws which provide
penalties for the pirating of trade secrets.
The traditional "invention patent" is designed to provide an alterna-
tive form of protection by granting the inventor legal means to prevent
others from copying or using the invention without permission for a
limitedperiodoftime (usuallyfifteen years). Inventionpatentdocuments
are required to provide an "enabling disclosure" which sufficiently de-
scribes the invention to enable one skilled in the technology field to
replicate or make the invention.
2
Three fundamental requirements must be met by an invention to
qualify for the standard invention patent:
(1) The invention must be "novel."
(2) The invention must be "useful."
(3) The invention must exhibit an "inventive step" (i.e., it must be
unobvious to practitioners skilled in the technology field).
These requirements are important in understanding international pa-
tent datawhen considered in conjunctionwith internationalpatent "con-
ventions," chiefly the Paris Convention. Membership in these conven-
tions generally requires: (1) that the three requirements for patentability
bejudgedby internationalstandards and (2) thatmembercountries grant
patent protection to inventors from other countries provided these stan-
dards are met.3
An important alternative to the invention patent used in some coun-
tries is a "petty" patent or utility model. Petty patents generally have a
very weak inventive step requirement and in practical terms do not
always require novelty against the world's inventions but only against
national or regional inventions. In addition, design patents, which do not
require inventive steps and have relatively weak usefulness require-
2. The legal literature sees this enabling disclosure, which enables or induces further
inventions by others, as an important part of the bargain in which monopoly rights are
granted in return for disclosure. (Economists, by contrast, see invention incentives as the
principal benefit obtained in the bargain.)
3. I will argue in the final section of this paper that membership in international
conventions has beenvery costly (andunwise) for manycountries. Thecostofsearching the
world's patent literature to establish novelty is high, and many small countries cannot
adequately undertakethis task. Furthermore, adhering to a stronginternationalstandardof
the inventive step requirement effectively removes patent protection from "adaptive"
inventions which are about the only types of inventions many developing countries can
produce.92 Robert E. Evenson
ments, are granted by most countries. Trademarks, which require only
novelty, are likewise granted by most countries. In addition, a numberof
countries also grant plant patents, primarily for asexually reproduced
plants.
Table 5.1 provides data for forty-nine countries on numbers ofinven-
tion patentsgrantedduringfour periods: 1967, 1971, 1976, and 1980. The
countries have been grouped into six classes: (1) industrialized market
economies with moderate to rapid growth rates over the past twenty
years; (2) industrialized market economies with slow growth rates; (3)
semi-industrialized economies with rapid growth rates; (4) semi-indus-
trialized economies with slow to moderate growth rates; (5) middle-to-
low-income developing economies; and (6) industrialized planned
economies.
4
Reference to the table will reveal a few anomalies, particularlyfor the
developing countries where some data are missing. Table 5.9 provides a
summary by type of economy and a number of generalizations are best
drawn atthatlevel. In discussing this and the nextseveral tables attention
will be given to individual country data. Table 5.1 shows that the relative
ranking ofpatenting by national inventors has changed appreciably over
theperiod. TheUnitedStateswas the clearleaderin 1967with more than
twice as many patents granted as the Soviet Union in second place.
France, Japan, East Germany and the United Kingdom followed. By
1980 both the Soviet Union and Japan had surpassed the United States.
West Germany had moved into fourth place, with both France and the
United Kingdom experiencing substantial declines in patents granted to
nationals.
Patents granted to nationals in the United States were only 72 percent
ofthe 1967levelin 1980 (only 60 percentin 1979). Forall otherindustrial-
ized market economies, patents granted to nationals actually increased
slightly (2 percent) from 1967-1980. Patents granted to foreigners in the
UnitedStatesrose by 71 percentovertheperiod. Forotherindustrialized
nations, patents granted to foreigners declined to only 66 percent of the
1967 level (about43 percentofthis decline was attributableto the decline
in patenting abroad by U.S. inventors). In consequence the share of
foreigner's patentingin the United States rose from 22 percentin 1967 to
40 percent in 1980.
Of the industrialized economies both Japan and West Germany
markedly expanded patenting activity at home. OnlyJapan, among large
industrialized nations, realized a significant expansion of patenting
abroad. The United States continued to be the dominant country in
patenting abroad with West Germany, Japan, and France following.
5
4. These classifications are based on World Bank (1980).
5. Patenting abroad is influenced by cost considerations. The European countries have














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.96 Robert E. Evenson
The semi-industrialized nations have a varied experience in patenting.
Most ofthe rapid-growth countries show expansion in patents granted to
nationals (or have relatively high levels of patenting, e.g., Spain). The
slowergrowingsemi-industrializedcountriesin generalhave experienced
some decline in national patenting. Patents granted to foreigners have
tendedtoincreasein thefast growingsemi-industrializedcountriesandto
decrease quite drastically in the slow-growth countries (for the group,
patentingby foreigners was only 40 percentofits 1967 level in 1980). This
decline reflects policy changes by this group of countries and other
developing countries toward multinational firms. In general, through
adminstrative procedures and through exclusion of certain technology
areasfrom patentability (chiefly food anddrugs), patentingby foreigners
has beencutback. Unfortunately, as will be discu~sedlater, thesepolicies
have not produced significant expansion in patenting by nationals.
The developing countries on the whole have relatively low levels of
national patenting and high ratios ofpatenting by foreigners (policies in
India have curtailed the latter). While data on patenting abroad are
incomplete, available data for both semi-industrialized and developing
countries indicate thatthe ratio ofpatentingabroadto patenting at home
is much lower than is the case for industrialized countries.
The industrialized planned economies in general have relatively high
levels of patenting by nationals and low levels of foreign patenting and
patenting abroad. With the exception of East Germany and Rumania,
theplannedeconomieshave expandedpatentingactivityovertheperiod.
This and the low levels of patenting by planned economy inventors in
industrialized market economies suggests that patentability standards
may differ considerably between industrialized market and planned
economies.
6
Table 5.2 provides a summary of data for nine countries operating
utility model orpettypatentsystems. All ofthese countries are relatively
successful in invention given their levels of development (Brazil intro-
duced its utility model in 1970 andwe have only recent data; Italy has not
reported recent data). Petty patents are granted primarily to nationals
(although West Germany has granted a significant number to foreigners
from countries without petty patent systems). They are also granted
primarily to individuals rather than to large corporate firms. Most are
granted in mechanical technology rather than in chemical or biogentic
technology.
member countries. This legal instrument will have important implications for future data
interpretation but has had little impact on the data reported here. Proximity of markets is
also a factor in patentingabroad-particularlyin the case ofCanada and the United States.
6. Table 5.4 indicates that a considerable part of patenting abroad by the planned
economiesis in otherplannedeonomies. The plannedeconomies also have ratios ofpatents





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.98 Robert E. Evenson
The advantage ofthe pettypatentis thatit broadenstheinvention base
by providing incentives to encourage individuals and small firms to de-
velop inventions. Some semi-industrial countries, notably South Korea
and now Brazil, are using this legal system effectively. Japan and West
Germany have used it effectively in the past.
Table5.3 providesdatafor twoweakerlegalinstruments: the industrial
design patent and the trademark. In a sense, a design patent is a petty
patent and may serve a similar purpose. Those countries with petty
patent systems also have relatively active design patent systems. Design
patents have generally not experienced the same pattern of decline
observed in invention patents. Except for Canada and the smaller Euro-
pean countries, design patenting by foreigners is a relatively small frac-
tionoftotalpatenting. Thisis particularlytruefor semi-industrialized and
developing countries where multinational firms have not utilized this
instrument for protection (in contrast to the use of invention patents).
The dataon trademarks, ontheotherhand, show thatforeign firms are
using trademark protection in most markets, including the semi-
industrialized and developing countries. An expansion of trademark
registration to nationals and foreigners is observed in the majority of
economies of all types except the planned economies. This is consistent
with the general pattern of industrial trade expansion.
5.2 Comparative Advantage Patterns
Table 5.1 provides data on patents granted to nationals at home, on
patents granted to nationals abroad, and on patents granted to foreign
inventors. The ratio of patents granted to nationals to total patents
granted varied from a high of .76 in the planned economies (and the
United States) to a low of .11 for all developing economies in the late
1960s (see table 5.9 for a summary). The ratio of patents granted to
nationals to patents granted to nationals abroad ranged from over2.0for
many developing countries to around .1 for developing and slow-growth
semi-industrialized countries.
The first ratio is related to the level of development of the country in
question and to its size and degree of economic integration with other
countries (particularlyfor the EuropeanEconomicCommunitymembers
and Canada and the United States). It is relevant to this discussion,
however, because it indexes technology trade between countries. A firm
has an incentive to obtain patent protection in a second country either
because it is exporting products protected by the patent to the second
country, producing such products in the second country, or selling tech-
nology directly through a licensing or technical agreement. The cost of
obtaining patents abroad will be a factor in the firm's decision to patent























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.102 Robert E. Evenson
The ratio of patents granted to nationals to total patents has risen in
most rapidly growing economies and declined in most slow growing
economies. For example, in the United States the ratio fell from .78 in
1967 to .60 in 1980. InJapan it rose from .66 to .82 over the same period.
This can be taken as an index ofchanging comparative advantage. Table
5.4 presents patent (trade) "balance" data for 1967 and 1980. These data
are organized to present the persepective of the granting country (i.e.,
row proportions sum to one). These data show that the great bulk of
foreign patents granted in all countries, whether industrial, semi-indus-
trial, developing, or planned, originate in industrial countries. Even the
Table 5.4 Patent Balance Data, 1967 and 1980: Perspective of Granting Country
Percent Originating in
Patents
Granted to United United
Foreigners States Kingdom Germany
Granting
Country 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980
Industrial
Japan 6,896 8,074 .49 .49 .09 .06 .16 .05
Austria 3,920 4,481 .21 .13 .07 .04 .09 .46
France 31,749 19.622 .34 .28 .11 .07 .24 .26
Denmark 1,997 1,453 .23 .22 .11 .09 .22 .23
W. Germany 8,300 10,362 .41 .31 .12 .06
Belgium na 5,081 na .32 na .04 na .17
Norway 1,817 1,843 .26 .23 .11 .08 .19 .15
Netherlands 1,913 2,907 .31 .30 .10 .05 .22 .21
Canada 24,753 22,392 .55 .60 .05 .28 .08
Italy na 6,190 na .01 na .01 na .29
Ireland 635 1,407 .29 .32 .24 .17 .11 .16
Switzerland 16,462 4,486 .22 .22 .08 .05 .38 .32
Sweden 7,532 3,604 .32 .29 .10 .06 .25 .22
United States 14,378 24,675 .19 .09 .26 .14
United Kingdom 28,893 18,646 .47 .36 .24 .21
Finland 739 1,464 .20 .18 .05 .07 .17 .20
Semi-industrial
Spain 6,827 7,739 .27 .25 .08 .07 .17 .20
Israel 935 1,419 .39 .46 .10 .09 .13 .16
Greece 1,319 942 .29 .21 .06 .08 .12 .22
Portugal 1,038 2,200 .18 .23 .11 .08 .19 .17
S. Korea 152 1,446 .45 .26 .02 .04 .28 .08
Brazil 679 6,228 .42 .36 .08 .04 .13 .22
Chile 1,224 na .46 na .07 na .12 na
Venezuela 961 408 .59 .47 .04 .04 .05 .11
Argentina 4,479 na .50 na .08 na .08 na
Mexico 5,817 2,389 .44 .62 .03 .05 .02
Turkey 427 .29 .12 .21
Uruguay 350 236 .41 .24 .08 .12 .13 .13103 International Invention
Eastern European planned economies grant the bulk of their foreign
patents to Western European inventors.
The dominance ofindustrialcountriesin originationofpatentsgranted
abroad reflects their general comparative advantage in invention. The
ratio ofpatents granted to nationals abroad to patents granted to nation-
als at home is a rough index of the degree of "pioneeringness" or
"adaptiveness" ofinvention. This index is affected by size ofcountry and
proximity of similar countries (as in the EEC) and thus is not ideal. It
varies so markedly between industrial countries (around 2) and semi-
industrial countries (.15-.25) and developing countries (.1) that no rea-
Percent Originating in
Other Semi-
Japan Industrial Planned industrial Developing
1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980
.25 .31 .01 .04 .002
.02 .04 .66 .27 .09 .05 .02 .01 .002
.04 .10 .21 .21 .05 .05 .01 .03 .001
.02 .06 .39 .37 .02 .03 .01 .08 .002
.04 .23 .37 .32 .05 .05 .01 .03 .001
na .06 na .38 na .03 na .03 na .001
.02 .05 .50 .47 .005 .02 .005 .004 .006 .001
.02 .15 .32 .26 .02 .02 .01 .006
.08 .09 .03 .15 .04 .01 .012 .02 .008 .001
na na .55 na .05 na .09 na .005
.01 .01 .33 .32 .01 .02 .005 .005
.02 .09 .27 .27 .02 .04 .01 .006 .001
.01 .07 .28 .32 .03 .04 .003 .01 .001
.10 .25 .40 .53 .02 .03 .02 .02 .01 .001
.07 .12 .16 .28 .01 .01 .04 .02 .01
.01 .04 .53 .39 .03 .09 .005 .02 .003 .01
.01 .05 .45 .40 .01 .02 .004 .007 .01 .001
.01 .02 .35 .26 .01 .01 .01 .001 .001 .001
.02 .03 .46 .38 .03 .05 .02 .02 .001 .01
.01 .03 .45 .42 .005 .01 .05 .05 .01 .01
.50 .24 .09 .02 .002 .007 .01
.01 .06 .32 .30 .001 .01 .03 .01 .01 .001
.03 na .26 na .01 na .04 na .007
.03 .03 .28 .23 .01 .01 .09 .001 .02
.01 na .31 na .005 na .01 na .008
.10 .03 .31 .26 .06 .01 .04 .02 .07
.002 .33 .04 .007




Granted to United United
Foreigners States Kingdom Germany
Granting
Country 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980
Developing
Ecuador 126 103 .41 .56 .04 .01 .21 .04
Iraq 161 24 .34 .08 .10 .20 .17 .20
Morocco 387 330 .21 .22 .04 .03 .10 .12
U.A.R. (Egypt) 867 317 .27 .31 .06 .07 .14 .19
Colombia 848 808 .57 .58 .08 .04 .10 .05
Philippines 496 775 .67 .54 .05 .03 .03 .08
Kenya 104 97 .24 .28 .40 .21 .05 .14
India 3,329 na .33 na .24 na .11 na
Sri Lanka 53 174 .21 .42 .15 .17 .06 .08
O.A.P.I. 513 136 .12 .10 .03 .06 .06 .61
Planned
E. Germany 1,553 1,371 .03 .20 .09 .04 .40 .27
Czechoslovakia 787 1,546 .05 .18 .05 .07 .17 .27
Soviet Union 503 1,572 .07 .22 .17 .05 .17 .20
Hungary 512 1,018 .06 .17 .08 .06 .18 .26
Poland 484 1,962 .07 .22 .08 .07 .14 .03
Bulgaria 166 425 .03 .06 .02 .08 .28 .29
Yugoslavia 644 na .07 na .07 na .18 na
Rumania 1,283 814 .06 .24 .06 .04 .21 .24
Patents Originating Summary
Patents Granted Patents Originated
1967 1980 1967 1980 --
Industrial 149,994 146,714 181,243 172,651
Semi-industrial 24,208 23,716 1,796 1,913
Developing 6,884 6,221 805 750
Planned 5,932 8,708 6,225 6,426
Source: Industrial Property Statistical Report, annual issues, World IntellectualPropertyOrga-
nization, Geneva.
sonable adjustment for these factors would alterthe picture. Invention in
developing countries is almost entirely adaptive in nature. Some of the
more advanced semi-industrial economies (Spain, Israel, Brazil) appear
to have significant pioneering invention, but they are still predominantly
adaptive. The data from the planned economies are more difficult to
interpret as they may be subject to considerable domestic policy effects.
The overall picture that emerges from these data supports both the
notionoftechnologytrade basedonthe differentiation ofinvention along
a pioneering-adaptive continuum. Developing and semi-industrialized105 International Invention
Percent Originating in
Other Semi-
Japan Industrial Planned industrial Developing
1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980 1967 1980
.05 .31 .28 .02 .04 .008 .02
.06 .23 .44 .09 .08 .006 .006
.003 .01 .57 .52 .03 .03 .04 .04 .003 .03
.018 .05 .32 .32 .19 .02 .01 .04 .002 .003
.01 .02 .21 .26 .006 .01 .02 .03 .006 .01
.09 .12 .15 .18 .02 .002 .02 .008 .01
.02 .01 .26 .35 .01 .03
.04 na .22 .05 na .008 na .004
.02 .04 .54 .25 .02 .02 .01 .01
.002 .78 .20 .01 .004 .02 .004
.01 .02 .32 .23 .13 .22 .003 .02 .02 .002
.01 .07 .35 .10 .37 .28 .005 .03
.07 .10 .48 .30 .04 .13 .004 .002 .001
.01 .04 .42 .21 .24 .24 .004 .02 .01 .003
.004 .03 .35 .51 .35 .14 .004 .001 .002
.02 .02 .45 .19 .19 .36 .006 .002 .006
.02 na .46 na .20 na na na
.02 .02 .39 .29 .25 .16 .01 .01 .005 .005
countries are overwhelmingly importers of technology and they special-
ize in adaptive invention at home. The jockeying for position among
industrialized-country exporters has changed somewhat in the past four
years with Japan moving into a strong competitive position. The U.S.
share ofpatent exports fell from .37 in 1967 to .30 in 1979. Japan's share
rose from .03 to .11.
The notion that developing countries engage in mostly adaptive inven-
tion suggests that inventions made in more highly developed countries
"disclose" possibilities for modifications of these inventions in the
"downstream" developing countries. Clearly their invention is different
incharacterthanthatofdevelopedcountries. Itis apparentlyoflow value
"upstream"in industrialized, developedcountrieswith high wages. Since
these countries do obtain some patents abroad it will be useful to look at
the patterns of this invention.
Table 5.5 provides data organizedfrom the perspective ofthe originat-
ing country for 1980. Predictably, most patenting abroad originates in
developed countries. This is where the large markets are. Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico, however, do appear to be patenting "downstream"
in developing Latin American countries to a significant extent. This106 Robert E. Evenson
Table 5.5 Patent Balance Data, 1980: Perspective of Originating Country
Percent Granted in
Other
Origin Country United Ger- Indus-
(Patents Originated) States Japan many trial Planned
Japan (20,663) .35 .11 .422 .022
Austria (1,669) .158 .022 .015 .70 .013
France (12,511) .167 .035 .073 .479 .055
Denmark (1,103) .148 .027 .061 .63 .057
W. Germany (33,708) .171 .040 .584 .006
Belgium (1,720) .144 .028 .038 .604 .039
Norway (549) .144 .044 .064 .562 .086
Netherlands (5,964) .109 .059 .090 .571 .031
Canada (2,200) .503 .036 .037 .326 .015
Italy (5,877) .137 .025 .052 .506 .061
Ireland (107) .206 .009 .047 .599
Switzerland (9,827) .127 .041 .096 .50 .059
Sweden (4,769) .173 .042 .058 .594 .044
United States (54,360) .073 .059 .678 .033
United Kingdom . (11,140) .219 .041 .054 .478 .045
Finland (928) .133 .022 .033 .599 .100
Spain (1,180) .028 .006 .009 .85 .007
Israel (316) .377 .044 .474
Greece (691) .006 .003 .986 .003
Brazil (113) .204 .018 .009 .397 .009
Argentina (133) .211 .015 .008 .187 .015
Mexico (171) .275 .029 .018 .326 .029
India (57) .175 .053 .018 .489 .018
Panama (233) .009 .021 .562 .069
Bahamas (103) .058 .049 .524 .058
provides some support for the adaptiveness hypothesis, but a full treat-
ment would require detailed industry data.
7
Data on receipt of royalties and fees to U.S. residents for the use of
intangible property such as patents, techniques, process designs, trade-
marks, and other technology-related activities show that the export of
technology is not a trivial activity. Total receipts of royalties and fees
were $5.5 billion in 1978.
8 Product trade data also show that exports of
R&D intensive products have been important to the U.S. economy. In
1964 thetradebalanceinR&Dintensive manufacturedproductsshowed
7. Such data are now becoming available from the International Patent Documentation
Center (INPADOC 1981). Patents can be classified by International Patent Class (IPC). A
concordance between IPC and Standard Industrial Classes (SIC) has been made by
INPADOC. F. M. Sherer (this volume) has questioned the value ofsuch concordances, but
for reasonably broad industrial classes they may be adequate.
8. See table 5.8 for data from several OECD countries on receipts and payments of




America Africa Asia Europe America Africa Asia
.021 .05 .022 .001 .001 .001
.022 .017 .033 .002 .015 .003
.016 .016 .128 .002 .023 .006
.014 .012 .044 .001 .006
.049 .014 .064 .002 .005 .005
.024 .020 .075 .005 .015 .008
.024 .016 .056 .004
.045 .008 .078 .002 .003 .004
.033 .012 .022 .009 .006 .001
.066 .015 .118 .003 .011 .006
.065 .019 .037 .009 .009
.044 .030 .080 .003 .013 .007
.030 .006 .048 .0002 .004 .001
.066 .027 .048 .005 .007 .004
.027 .038 .074 .003 .013 .008
.055 .002 .044 .009 .001 .002
.042 .003 .039 .006 .008 .002
.070 .003 .032
.001 .001
.150 .186 .009 .009 .009
.406 .090 .068
.088 .006 .053 .123 .006 .047
.053 .123 .053 .018
.039 .034 .150 .004 .026 .086
.039 .029 .126 .049 .049 .019
net exports of $8.8 billion and net imports of $3.7 billion in non-R & D
intensive manufactured products. In 1979 net exports ofR&D intensive
manufactured products had grown to $39.3 billion, but net imports of
non-R & D intensive productshad grown to $34.8 billion. (These data do
not include agricultural and mineral products, also important in trade.)
5.3 Evidence of Declining Patent/Inventive Input Ratios
I now turn to four data sets on patents and inventive inputs (scientists
and engineers engaged in R&D and R&D spending) to examine the
questionof"inventorproductivity." Allfour datasetsshowthatthe ratio
of patents granted per unit of inventive input has fallen from 1964 to
1979-80. This decline shows up for almost all ofthe industries in the two
data sets (United States and Japan) where industry-specific data are
available. The decline shows up in each of the five countries for which108 Robert E. Evenson
OECDdataareavailable (UnitedStates, UnitedKingdom, France, West
Germany, andJapan), anditshows up in mostoftheforty-four countries
for which UNESCO data are available.
A decline in the ratio of patents granted to inventive inputs need not
imply that real invention per unit of inventive input has declined. A
changein the"propensitytopatent" (i.e.,patentsgrantedperunitofreal
invention) could have produced the results reported here. A rise in the
cost of obtaining and enforcing patents, changes in legal systems, and
changes in company policies could produce changes in the propensity to
patent. We know that some changes have occurred particularly because
of rising patent enforcement costs. A few countries have changed their
legal systems as well. However, many countries have not experienced
rises in patentenforcement costs and have actively encouragedinvention
throughsubsidies andfavorable taxtreatment. Changesin thepropensity
to patent are unlikely to explain the universal decline in patenting per
inventive input unit shown by the data.
9
Consider first the data by industry for the United States. Table 5.6
provides the most detailed industry data readily available on patents
granted to nationals and foreigners, R&D expenditures (in 1972 con-
stantdollars), andscientists andengineersengagedinR&D. Dataonthe
proportion funded by government and on the proportion considered
"basic" and "development" are also provided by the National Science
Foundation.
Table 5.6 shows thatR&D spending perscientist and engineer, while
varying somewhat by industry, has changed little from 1964 to 1978. It
increased at an annual rate of only .0047. Patenting per scientist and
engineer fell at an annual rate of - .0126 from 1964-66 to 1971-72 and
- .0439 from 1971-72 to 1976-78 (- .0283 over the entire period.) Re-
gression (1) provides a statistical description of this decline, controlling
for industry effects. The annual rates are unchanged bythe correctionfor
industry effects, and the decline from 1964-66 to 1976-78 is highly
significant from a statistical perspective. (These data do not include
patenting for 1979 and 1980.) At the national level, patents granted to
national inventors declined by 10.2 percent from 1976-78 to 1980 (this
excludesthe extraordinarilylow patentingin 1979). Numbersofscientists
and engineers andR&D expenditures rose by roughly 10 percentduring
this period. (In table 5.6, R&D and scientists and engineers data are
lagged behind patents granted by two years).
Since R&D spending rose relative to scientists and engineers only
slightly, patents grantedper dollar spent onR&D declined only slightly
more than is the case for scientists and engineers. The table also shows
thatthe ratio ofnationaltoforeign patentingfell in everyindustryin both
9. The data utilized in table 5.6 are summarized in National Science Board (1981).109 International Invention
periods. The change in this ratio is positively correlated with the change
in laborproductivityacross industries overthe 1966-78period (r == .583).
There is also a positive correlation between the change in the national to
foreign patentratio andthechange in nationalpatentingperscientist and
engineer (.346 overthe entireperiod; .556 in thesecondhalf). Changesin
national patenting and foreign patenting are positively correlatedfor the
1966-78period(r == .701), butchangesin nationalpatentingin the second
half of the period are negatively correlated with changes in foreign
patenting in the first period (r == - .631). The converse is also true
(r == .342).10
Regressions (2) and (3) in table 5.6 report a simple effort to controlfor
some characteristics of the research system on patenting per unit of
inventive input. They provide some evidence that government funding
increases inventive outputwhile emphasis on basic research decreases it.
Oursecond setofdatareportedin table 5.7 includes industrylevel data
for Japan. These data show that patent applications per scientist and
engineer were lower in 1975-76 than in 1967-68 in all industries except
textiles and foods, where they were unchanged. Patent applications per
dollarexpendedonR&D also declined becauseR&Dperscientistrose.
(R & D spending is expressed in millions of 1970 constant yen.) A
positive correlation between the changes in patents per scientists and
engineers by industry between the United States and Japan exists with
the transport (motor vehicles) and nonelectric machinery industries in
both countries experiencing the largest declines.
Table 5.8 reports our third data set. These data were collected by the
OECD and are somewhatmore reliable than thefourth datasetcollected
by UNESCO (summarized in table 5.9). The five countries included in
the table undertake the bulkoftheworld'sR&D. The decline in patents
granted to national inventors perscientist and engineer (the scientist and
engineer andR&D dataare lagged two years priortothepatentingdata,
i.e., for the 1967 column S&Eand R&D data are for 1965) shows up in
each country. In the cases of Japan and Germany, patents per scientist
and engineerpeakedin 1971. In theUnitedStates, UnitedKingdom, and
France, this ratio has declined since 1967. In terms ofthe date ofinvest-
ment in R&D, these declines set in two years earlier. The decline was
therefore not directly associated with the energy price increases of the
early 1970s.
11
10. Some variation in patents granted is from changes in the "backlog" of patents
applied for but not examined. A decline in patents granted in period T due to an increase in
the backlog will produce an increase in patentsgranted in a laterperiod. In the U.S. Patent
Office, 1979 was a particularly bad year in this regard, and patenting was low because ofan
increase in the backlog. The 1979 data for the United States, United Kingdom, and France
are not used in any of the calculations made in this paper because of this problem.
11. The data on R&D and Industrial Product (IDP) have first been converted to 1971

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.114 Robert E. Evenson
The data on the ratio of expenditures on R&D to industrial product
show this ratio to be declining sharply in the United States and rising
significantly in Japan andWest Germany. In 1980 these five countriesdid
not differ greatly on this measure.
We also have dataonroyalties andfees paid and received for these five
countries (expressed in "real" U.S. dollars as was R&D). The ratios of
royalties and fees received per patent granted to nationals abroad are
relatively low for West Germany and Japan, while the reverse is true for
the ratio of payments made per patent granted to foreigners. These two
countries are "aggressive" about expandingtheirR&D investments and
patenting in foreign countries. Their strategy has generally been to
borroworimport technology to buildtheir own capacity. This is reflected
in the fact that they pay substantial fees for imported technology and
receive relatively low payments for their patenting abroad (although it
should be noted that the payments data are for patents granted in prior
years and do not match up with the patents data in the table.)12
Table 5.9 provides a summary of international data for forty-four
countries (see table5.1 for classification byregion). Rows (1)-(5) provide
means ofthe patent and trademark data reported in tables 5.1 and 5.3 by
region. These means highlight the major features of the patent data.
They show the decline in the importance of the United States in world
patenting and the rise in importance of Japan, West Germany, and the
planned economies. They also show the marked differences in patents
granted abroad to patents granted at home-a measure of adaptiveness
ofinvention-betweenthe industrialized nations and the semi-industrial-
ized and developing economies. They further show the high degree of
foreign patenting in most of the world's economies.
Rows (6)-(9) provide data on ratios ofpatenting to numbers ofscien-
tists and engineers in the productive sector and on patenting to R&D
expenditures in the productive sector. It should be noted that both the
S & E data and the R&D data are subject to considerable errors. The
UNESCO data provide a breakdown of both for the "productive" (i.e.,
industry, transport, commerce), education, and service sectors. I have
used the data from the productive sector. A further problem with these
data is thatthey are not available for all years andsomeinterpolationwas
using the purchasing power parity exchange rate of Kravis, Summers, and Heston (1980).
Thisexchange rateis designed to enable bettercomparabilityofincomes betweencountries.
The real costs of undertaking research may not be closely related to the real costs of
producing goods generally. We do not have an ideal deflator for R&D spending in any
single country and obviously no ideal deflatorexists to achieve cross-country comparability.
This paperdoes not attemptto drawstrongconclusions from cross-countrycomparisons as a
consequence. They are reported as a matter of convenience (but see note 12).
12. This inference requires comparability in the real dollar conversions. While express-
ing skepticism aboutconversion rates (see note 11), one can probablysay that the problems
are less serious for this group of countries than for most others.115 International Invention
required.
13 The most serious problem, however, is the exchange rate
conversion. This conversion is relevant only if one wishes to make cross-
section comparisons. Comparisonsovertime requireonly an appropriate
deflator to convert expenditures to a constant currency unit. Row (8)
provides R&D data in constant 1972 U.S. dollars where standard
exchange rate conversions to dollars were made and where the U.S.
deflatorwas used. Row (7) utilizes the purchasingpowerparity exchange
rates developed by Kravis, Summers, and Heston (1980). This deflator
modifies both the time series and cross-section aspect of the conversion
and, while imperfect for the task at hand, is probably the best available.
Examination ofthe data in row (6) shows that patentsperscientist and
engineer have declined in the industrialized and slow growing semi-
industrialized countries (which account for most ofthe world'spatents-
see row [1]). The numbersin parentheses are regression estimates ofthe
decline in the ratios within countries (i.e., country dummies were in-
cluded in the regressions). Statistically significant declines are shown for
the last two periods relative to the first for these groups. In addition,
virtually all individual countries in each group showed declines in the
ratios. These ratios do vary considerably by type of economy, with the
semi-industrialized countries (notably those with rapid growth) showing
ratios far above the industrialized country standard. Developing coun-
tries are generally far below the industrialized countries in this regard.
In developing countries a relatively high proportion oftime is devoted
to adaptive invention, much of which is not patentable. Many of these
countries have vented frustration over the terms on which technology is
purchased in international forums. Few have shown imagination in de-
veloping legal systems suited to their competitive position in interna-
tional invention. Most invention from these countries is adaptive. Yet
they have generally not modified their patent systems to encourage
adaptive invention. They have instead opted to weaken the scope of
patentcoverage in an attempt to discourage foreign patenting. In this the
slow-growth industrialized economies and the developing economies
have been successful. Unfortunately, theyhave also discouraged national
invention in the process.
The data on patents per dollar expended on R&D are somewhat less
regularin showing declines in patentingperunit ofinventive activity than
are the data on patentsper scientist and engineer. Part of this is because
of the problem of deflating these data appropriately. The data show
13. UNESCO statisticalyearbooks provide datafor available years andit is not possible
to match up the data for all relevant years. Simple interpolation was used to fill in missing
years. The classification ofR&D and S & E data by type ofperformingorganization is also
subject to some differencesbetweencountries. Personneldataare classifiedas scientists and
engineers, technicians, and other personnel. The inclusion of technicians in the data

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.118 Robert E. Evenson
general declines in patenting per dollar expended in R&D except in the
rapidly growing semi-industrialized economies, in the planned econo-
mies, and for the data deflated by the purchasing power parity exchange
rate for the rapidly growing industrialized economies. 14
Row (9) of the table corroborates the pattern observed in the OECD
countriesofa decline in theshareofindustrialproductdevoted to R&D.
This share has declined in virtually all countries in the data set, including
the planned economies. This is consistent with the proposition that
invention has become more costly (i.e., that the probability ofdiscovery
has declined). The magnitude of this deline in investment is highly
significant and has important policy implications for growth when con-
sidered along with the evidence for declining productivity of invention.
Table 5.9 also reports an investment regression for each of these
regions that is more "descriptive" in nature than analytical. In each
region the log of R&D is regressed on the log of industrial Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), the industrial growth rate in the previous ten
years, and the trade intensity ofthe country (i.e., the ratio ofthe value of
trade to GDP). Country and time dummy variables are included to pick
up constant country effects. These regressions, while not particularly
remarkable given the data and the problem ofinternational comparabil-
ity, suggest that investment decisions are reasonably systematic. Except
for the slow growing semi-industrialized economies (a rather mixed bag
of countries), investment in R&D is related to industry size. There is
little evidence that past industry growth affects investment decisions
(although this might differ ifwe had detailed industry data). Openness to
trade appears to have a positive effect on R&D spending in the fast
growing economies and a negative effect in the slow growing economies.
The interpretation ofthis result is not readily obvious since openness to
trade and willingness to invest in R&D may be jointly determined by a
set of political factors. It is tempting to suggest that aggressive growth
strategies, as by Japan and West Germany, produce this positive correla-
tion, while the reverse is true for those countries pursuingless aggressive
growthpolicies. Thistype ofdata, however, is not reallysuitedto test that
proposition, and these regressions are accordingly presented here in a
data table and labeled descriptive. 15
To conclude that a significant decline in real productivity ofinvention
has taken place does not require proofthat the propensity to patent has
not changed. Themagnitude ofthe declines in patentingperscientist and
14. A simple regression: LN(PN/S & E) = bLN(R & DIS & E) plus country and time
dummies was run for each country group. The b coefficient was positive in all cases and
greater than its standard error in all but the slow growing industrialized countries. This
indicatesthat R&D data are measuring real scientific resources rather than scientists' and
engineers' time. The time dummy coefficients were similar to those reported in row (6).
15. The problem of shifts between industries is particularly problematic for such com-
parisons.119 International Invention
engineerandperunit ofR&D in the OECD countriesfor which we have
good data is large. Furthermore, these countries have reduced spending
on R&D relative to the market for inventions by significant amounts,
presumably in response to a decline in invention potential. Broad cycles
in growth potential have marked our history before. The 1970s may well
have been more normal in this regard than the 1950s and 1960s.
Our data force us to deal with broad aggregates. If we had more
detailed data by technology field, we would probably find that even prior
to 1965 many technology fields were exhibiting declines in invention
potential. This was true in the 1970s as well. Itis justthatthe declines are
outweighing the increases. One needonly look at detailed patentingdata
bysubclass to notecycles. Patentingactivitymaybesporadicfor aperiod,
then increase to a peak, and then decline. Of the patent subclasses
utilized in the U.S. Patent Office today, the majority are considered
"dead art" (i.e., patenting activity has ceased).
The natural model underlying these data is a search model in which a
pool ofpotential invention is determined by existing technical and scien-
tific knowledge. The pool is depleted by inventive activity and recharged
in various ways. Other related inventive activity can recharge pools
through disclosure effects. More basic scientific and technical research
can produce findings which recharge as well.
16
5.4 Implications for Studies of Technology
Moststudies ofthe economic determinantsofR&Dspending by firms
or of the economic outcomes attendant to that spending have not taken
trade effects into account. Many studies have implicitly, ifnot explicitly,
supposed that firms do not have the option to purchase new technology
directly, except in "embodied" form in capital goods. In addition, many
studies presume that the probability of discovery from a firm's R&D is
constant over significant periods of time. Most studies recognize that
industry-specific effects may be present in this probability, but few make
any attempt to take into account the degree ofadaptability oftheR&D
andits dependenceondiscoveries madebyotherfirms, includinginterna-
tional firms.
The data summarized in this paper, as well as the evidence on "over-
seas R&D" undertaken by U.S. multinational firms, suggest that for
many problems the international dimension cann()t be easily set aside.
17
Manyfirms have internationalR&D strategies with laboratories located
in different markets and economic environments. Virtually all R&D
activities have some elements of adaptiveness, and the probability of
16. Kislev and Evenson (1975) apply a simple search model to R&D processes. Such
models require some enrichment but may be a useful starting point for further study.
17. See the paper by Edwin Mansfield in this volume.120 Robert E. Evenson
discovery will depend on other firms making closely related discoveries.
Studies based on a sample of only large firms in one industry (or indus-
tries), such as many in this volume, do not provide a realistic picture of
industry equilibria regarding R&D strategy. Even in these large firms
the variation in R&D spending has been noted to be much higher than
for normalfactors ofproduction. 18 Hadtheentire industry beensampled,
we would find that some firms in some industries engage in practically no
formal R&D. Yet they exist in competitive equilibrium with otherfirms
engaging in significant levels of R&D.
International data show this pattern ofhigh variation in formal spend-
ing on R&D across countries. They also show that the degree of
adaptiveness of R&D is highly correlated with the level of R&D
spending. A further piece ofevidence suggesting that significant trade in
technology takes place is that many patented inventions are granted to
individuals either not associated with firms or associated with very small
firms. This would not occur to a very significant degree if it were not
possible to sell invented technology in forms disembodied from a
product.
The patent system is often seen primarily as a means for a firm to
prevent infringement on the technology it has discovered and is using in
production. A well-functioning patent system has two further important
aspects: First, patent systems enable the exchange of technology by
providing the basis for legal transactions. Second, patentsystems require
an "enabling disclosure" which legal scholars regard to be of great
importance. Removing invention from secrecy is considered the main
social benefit offsetting the cost ofthe limited monopoly granted. (Econ-
omists tend to stress incentives for invention as the major benefits.) We
observe thatwhenpatentsystems arefunctioning efficiently (i.e., thecost
of obtaining and enforcing patent production is low) it encourages tech-
nology trade. When patent systems are not efficient, technology trade
becomes closely integrated with product trade.
For certain types ofstudies, the fact that technology can be purchased
and sold, that R&D activities can vary in adaptiveness, and thatR&D
productivity may be influenced by other firms' discoveries requires that
we develop better "price" data for technology. Alternative types of
technology acquisition activities also must be better specified than at
present. We should, for example, be measuring a firm's investment in
pioneering R&D, adaptive R&D, licensing and royalty payments,
search costs for new designs, etc., if we are to understand fully the firm's
investment motives. We should define more meaningful price variables
facing the firm. Technology embodied in capital goods (or technical
services) supplied by other firms is available at a real price and is a
18. Pakes and Schankerman (this volume).121 International Invention
substitute for some types of R&D activity and is quite possibly com-
plementary to highly adaptive R&D. Other technology can be licensed
for a price. A firm's own technical capacity will affect the price it pays.
The supply side ofthese technology markets changes with new discover-
ies. Obviously, defining proxies for these prices will require a good deal
of imagination and probably a few good case studies. A few studies are
already showing progress on this score, however. 19
The issue ofchanging invention productivity is ofobvious importance,
independentofourinterestin investigatingfirm behaviormore clearly. If
invention potential pools are being depleted more rapidly than they are
being recharged, economic growth will suffer. Ifthis depletion-recharge
process differs significantly by industry and by economic environment, it
has important implications for comparative advantage and incomes
associated with it. The data reviewed in this paper are in many ways too
aggregative to investigate adequately the depletion-recharge issue. They
strongly suggest that the United States and a few otherdeveloped econo-
mies may have experienced a fairly broadscale netdepletion ofinvention
potential pools. Further, the international patterns of comparative
advantage appear to have changed markedly in recent years. The two
phenomena are related and their net effect on the U.S. economy in the
past fifteen years may have been quite significant. It is not unreasonable
to suppose that the potential economic growth of the economy (setting
aside macropolicy issues) may well have been considerably lower since
1965 or so than in the preceding fifteen to twenty years. It is also not
unreasonable to suppose that some loss of international comparative
advantage rents has been sustained by the economy.
As economists investigate this issue, policy attention will focus on the
recharge mechanism. Progress toward measuring the effectiveness of
alternative recharge strategies (investment in scientific research, etc.),
however, will depend on our ability to specify the depletion mechanisms
(i.e., the invention process). Patent data are now becoming available in
more detailed form (IPC classes) and for more countries.
20 They provide
scope for bothfirm level and more aggregate trade-type studies. Applica-
tion of trade theory to the issue should help sort out relevant issues.
A final pointcan bemaderegardingpatentsystempolicy. International
organizationshave pressedstronglyfor theestablishmentofinternational
agreements on intellectual property. These agreements are designed in
part to achieve standardization of legal system treatment of intellectual
19. Zvi Griliches (1979) discusses a numberofthe relevant issues. Some ofthe papersin
this volume, notably Mansfield and Ben-Zion, reflect concern for these points.
20. The richest data set is that provided by INPADOC (1981). Patents by IPC for some
fifty countries are now available for recent years. One can trace families ofpatents (i.e., the
same patent granted in a number of different countries), firm assignments, and data on
renewals.122 Robert E. Evenson
propertyrights and to lowerthe costs ofintercountryrecognition ofthese
rights. Implicitly, these international conventions seek to provide global
(or as much of the globe as possible) property rights to inventors in a
particular country. This may be a perfectly reasonable trade agreement
between certain countries (e.g., EEC countries). We have observed in
this paper, however, that trade in intellectual property is a very unequal
trade, with developing countries having a strong competitive disadvan-
tage in supplying intellectual property to developed country markets.
Their inventors do not have the economic laboratories and other re-
sources to enable them to be competitive.
Ironically, nations do not recognize global property rights in nonintel-
lectual property and regularly intervene in commodity and capital trade
markets to achieve nationalistic goals. With few exceptions, these same
nations have joinedinternationalconventions freely grantingintellectual
property rights to citizens of other countries. By doing so they have
gained some advantages in bargaining with multinational firms and in
some forms of technology purchase. But unless the cost of "pirating"
inventionsis veryhigh theyhave paidmore thannecessaryfor technology
purchased from abroad.
However, the most serious impact of membership in international
conventions may well be that it restricts the flexibility ofmany countries
to design legal systems tailored to their comparative advantage, particu-
larly regarding adaptive invention and the encouragement ofindigenous
secondary technology core development. Petty patent systems appear to
be one alternative; there are probably others.
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Comment Frederic M. Scherer
Professor Evenson has brought together a fascinating set of data on
patents and scientific and engineering employment in a broad cross
section of nations.
His most interesting finding is the apparent decline, with the notable
exceptions of Japan and West Germany, in patenting per scientist and
engineer between the late 1960s and 1970s. This supposedly occurred
because the pool of inventive possibilities became depleted. I find his
explanation consistent with my own qualitative observations on what
happened in a number of industries that experienced technological
booms and then entered a period of apparent maturity (Scherer 1978).
Nevertheless, some critical questions must be raised about what the data
mean.
If indeed the pool of inventive possibilities became "fished out," one
might suppose there would be increased effort to catch the same fish.
Given the way the patent system works, this might show up in an in-
creased incidence of"interferences"-thatis, two ormore parties claim-
ing to have made the same invention. Changes in the rules governing
interference proceedings under the U.S. patent system permit a compa-
rable time series dating back only to 1966. This, however, spans the
period analyzed by Evenson. The evidence runs contrary to the increas-
ing interference hypothesis. From 1966 to 1970, five interferences were
declared perthousandinvention patentapplications. (Interferenceswere
lagged a year behind applications to reflect examination delays.) The
incidence ofinterferencesfell during the next five years, and by 1976-80
theaverage numberofinterferenceswas onlythreeperthousand applica-
tions. Itwouldbeinterestingto knowwhethersimilarpatterns, seemingly
at odds with the depletion theory, are observed in other industrialized
nations.
Frederic M. Scherer is a professor in the Department of Economics at Swarthmore
College.124 Robert E. Evenson
An alternative possibility is that the propensity to patent an invention
ofgiven qualityfell duringthe 1970s. This might beso for severalreasons.
A number of studies (e.g., by Taylor and Silberston, [1973], Mansfield,
Schwartz, andWagner [1981] andmyself[1977]) have shownthatin many
industries patent protection is simply not a very important component of
the incentive structure underlying R&D investment. Perhaps business
decision makers came to recognize this and cut back their support of
patentprocessing activities. The relative importance ofpatentprotection
may also have declined as marketingmethodsbecamemoresophisticated
and "first in" image advantages served to blunt the threat of imitative
R&D. Still any "declining propensity to patent" hypothesis must also
come to grips with the exceptional cases, i.e., Japan and West Germany.
A long-time U.S. Patent Office official insisted in 1980 that Japanese
corporations were much more aggressive in seeking patent rights than
their U.S. counterparts. That West Germans place special stress on the
patent system's role is suggested by the existence of a large Max-Planck-
Institute in Munich studying patent matters-an operation that, to the
best ofmy knowledge, has no peer elsewhere in the world. Yet all this is
highly speculative. One would like to have firmer evidence, if possible,
on whether systematic changes have occurred over time in national
propensities to patent.
Before we can even begin to make such advances, we must have a
clearer idea ofwhat it is patents protect and what kinds of activities give
rise to patentable"inventions." Evenson argues thatapplied research, as
contrasted to "adaptive" research or the testing and pilot plant work of
development, is the most important source of invention patents. I ques-
tion whether this is so. My analysis of the Xerox Corporation's patent
portfolio indicated, for example, that the vast majority ofXerox patents
stemmed from activities that were clearly developmental in nature
(Scherer 1977, p. 9). And as the bleary-eyed reviewer of some 15,000
patent abstracts in connection with research described elsewhere in this
volume, I was struck by how narrowly incremental (adaptive?) most
"inventions" are. To the extent that I am right, it becomes less clear why
developing nations largely confined to adaptive work generate so few
patents. Perhaps what matters is not whether inventive activity is adapt-
ive, but whether the adaptation occurs near or far behind the frontier of
what has previously been accomplished. Much ofthe inventive activity in
developing nations maywell beobvious to onehavingordinaryskill in the
art, as U.S. patentability precedents put it. The real problem could be
that few people are skilled in the art. Further research onwhat activities
yield patentable invention (e.g., extending some of the investigations
described in Professor Mansfield's paper in this volume) would be desir-
able.125 International Invention
Whether or not recent patenting trends reveal significant depletion of
inventive possibilities, it seems probableto me that soonerorlatersuch a
depletion effect must be observed. Following Terleckyj (1974) and
others, a standard approach in studying the contibution of R&D to
productivity growth is to estimate the following cross-sectional rela-
tionship based upon production function theory:
(1)
. .. .
Q K L aQR TFP=- - (1-- ~-= A+--
Q K L aR Q'
where all variables are in logarithms, dots indicate time derivatives, Ais
an exogenous shift parameter, Q is output, R is the stock of knowledge
acquired through research and development, and the othervariables are
as conventionally interpreted. The last term is ofcentral interest. aQfa R
is the marginal product of additions to the R&D knowledge stock. Ris
the annual increase in the knowledge stock; assuming no depreciation, it
is simply the annual rate ofR&D spending. Between 1953 and 1969, real
R&D effort in the United States was growing at about 6 percent per
year. If one can believe the more heroic extrapolations of de Solla Price
(1963, chap. 1), scientific and engineering activity has been growing at
this rate for two-and-a-half centuries. Meanwhile, output per hour of
work (the left-hand side ofequation (1) without the kfK term) has been
growing at an average annual rate of about 2 percent over the past
century-the longest period for which we have tolerable data. The ques-
tion arises: Is there some law of nature requiring that we increase scien-
tific and engineering activity (undepreciated R) by 6 or so percent per
year to sustain labor productivity growth of 2 percent per year? That is
what equation (1) and the estimated component magnitudes imply. If
they are correct, we are heading for trouble, for as de Solla Price
observed (1963, p. 19):
It is clear that we cannot go up another two orders of magnitude as
we have climbed the last five. If we did, we should have two scientists
for every man, woman, child, and dog in thepopulation....Scientific
doomsday is therefore less than a century distant.
The main way outseems to be to increase the marginal product ofR &
D or, given the market's tendency to equalize yields at the margin, its
inframarginalcounterpart (i.e., the averageproductivityofR&D). How
canthat be done? Onepossibility thatmay beless far-out thanone might
suppose is to utilize rapidly evolving knowledge on the biochemistry of
mental processes to enhance scientific creativity. Another nearer the
province of economic analysis, and consistent with some of Mansfield's
recent findings, may be to secure a betterallocation ofresources between
basic research, with its substantial externalities, and applications-126 Robert E. Evenson
oriented n. & D. Or third, R&D resource allocation might be improved
by effecting a better international division of labor.
Evenson's patent data provide some indication that such a division of
labor is beginning to emerge. His impressions are consistent with the
results of a more elaborate analysis by Slama (1981) of the Osteuropa
Institute in Munich. Slamafitted a gravitational regression modelto both
patent and conventional trade flows data for a sizeable cross section of
nations. He discovered that intercountry patenting and trade flows were
greater, the larger the nations in a pair were and the smaller the geo-
graphic distance separating them. The distance slope coefficients were
larger for conventional trade than for patents, the latter beingmuch less
costly than goods to "transport." Like Evenson, Slama found a signifi-
cantly higher propensity to trade within the Soviet bloc planned econo-
mies than between East and West. Thus, we are beginning to find out
something aboutthe international division oflaborin advancing technol-
ogy. However, much more remains to be learned, especially about how
market processes encourage or discourage the division of scientific and
engineering labor and how much untapped potential for improving the
productivity of R&D that division of labor offers.
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